The Truth, Power, And Operation Of Spiritual Substances

In his Summa Thleologica, Saint Thomas Aquinas writes a treatise on man concerning the essence, power, and operation of spiritual substances. In his first article of the treatise, Thomas attempts to answer the question of whether or not the soul is a body. I will be explaining and evaluating the steps of his argument that a body can be a principle of life but that the soul cannot be corporeal, that is, a body. In response to the question of whether or not the soul is a body, Thomas takes the position that the soul is the form of the body of a living thing. He claims that, â€Å"†¦to seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things†¦show more content†¦Thomas states, however, that although some of the principles of life of a living being are corporeal, the first principle of life, or primary principle of life, is not corporeal. This incorporeal principle of life, Th omas maintains, is what we call the soul of a living being. He continues by saying, â€Å"†¦though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life† (Aquinas, 1920). This is because being a principle of life or a living being cannot belong to a body as such, for if this were the case, then it would be reasonable to say that every body is a living being or that every body is a soul. Thomas concludes his argument by stating, â€Å"Therefore, the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body† (Aquinas, 1920). One objection to Thomas’s argument is concerned with the soul being the moving principle of the body. It can be argued, â€Å"†¦because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives wh at it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat† (Aquinas, 1920). Given this reasoning, the soul is a mover moved, and since every mover moved is a body, the soul is therefore a body. Thomas sets about refuting this argument by saying if everything were moved by a mover, then the